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Abstract 
Insufficient sensitivity to scope remains one of the pivots of criticism addressed at validity of 
stated preference methods. Many studies demonstrate failure of a scope test of some sort, 
while many others show that WTP responses are sensitive to the scope of environmental 
change. Despite some existing explanations and reasons for insensitivity to scope (embedding, 
warm glow, uncertainty over supply of a public good, awareness of all options) there seems to 
exist no clear conclusion on how to deal with it. The paper provides an alternative explanation 
for insufficient sensitivity to scope, based on redefinition of value drivers of environmental 
goods. In the proposed framework respondents’ WTP need not depend only on physical 
characteristics of a valued good but may also partly be a function of a ‘label’ under which the 
environmental good is ‘sold’. To investigate this problem and empirically test the hypothesis 
and its implications a CE study in a biodiversity valuation setting is designed and conducted. 
The conceptual framework and empirical evidence provide an alternative explanation for 
problems with the insufficient sensitivity to scope observed in many studies. Finally, we set 
out some implications of the nature of labels as value drivers for the design of future valuation 
studies. 
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1.    Introduction 
Stated preference methods remain the only source of estimates for both use and non-use 
values, and hence can provide valuable inputs to cost-benefit analyses of environmental 
change. Despite the initial distrust many researchers held for such methods, they have 
eventually entered the “mainstream” of economic science (Carson and Hanemann, 2005), and 
are routinely used as part of the policy analysis process. However, certain important issues 
remain to be resolved in terms of enhancing the validity of welfare estimates. These issues 
have arisen in the context of testing whether the results of valuation methods are in line with 
the predictions of economic theory.  
 
There are at least two such tests. Firstly, it is expected that as the price increases the demand 
for an environmental good should decrease. For instance, in dichotomous choice CVM 
designs, this means that the ratio of the respondents who answer ‘yes’ to a bid question should 
decrease with increases of the bid amount. A second test consists of examining the prediction 
that respondents should be willing to pay more as the amount or quality of environmental 
good to be provided increases. Failure to pass this scope test has been traditionally one of the 
pivots of criticism of stated preference methods (Goodstein, 1995). The purpose of this paper 
is to investigate sources of failure to pass the scope test. An alternative explanation is 
proposed, based on redefinition of the value drivers of environmental goods. Empirically, we 
show that respondents’ WTP might depend not only on physical characteristics of a good 
being valued, but partly also on the ‘label’ under which the good is being ‘sold’. This 
provides an alternative explanation for problems with the scope test observed in many studies: 
failing to control for the effects of a label leads to a mis-interpretation of scope differences.  
 
In the next section, we briefly review the literature on scope tests, and then offer an 
alternative explanation in terms of labels. Section 3 describes the design of an empirical study 
to investigate this idea, whilst section 4 contains results. The final section concludes. 
 
 
2. Explaining Scope Effects, or their absence 
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2.1 Existing Literature 
As noted above, the scope test consists in testing whether respondents are willing to pay 
statistically more for a larger amount of an environmental good, in terms of increased quantity 
or quality. Even though the origins of this test can be tracked earlier, most of the debate was 
based on the critique put forward by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992).  
 
There exist two versions of scope test – internal and external. In an internal version the same 
respondents are asked to state their WTP for different levels of environmental good 
improvements. In an external version – two different levels are valued by different 
respondents using split sample. There seem to be less problems with internal scope tests 
(Brookshire et al., 1976; Smith and Osborne, 1996); some studies argue, however, that this 
might be due to the urge of the respondents to maintain ‘internal integrity’ of their answers 
(Heberlein et al., 2005). On the other hand, according to Adamowicz et al. (1999) an internal 
scope test allows for a comparison of pair wise WTP estimates of each respondent in the 
sample, and thus controls for the heterogeneity of the respondents. There seems to be no clear 
consensus in the literature whether insufficient sensitivity to scope is a regularly observed 
phenomenon, or happens occasionally, or on how its causes might be resolved and eliminated. 
Some of the best known examples of failing the scope test are given by Kahneman (1986), 
Kahneman and Knetsch (1992), Diamond and Hausman (1994), Hausman (1993), Cummings 
(1989), Schwartz (1997), Svedsäter (2000) and Shiell and Gold (2002). On the other hand 
there are meta-analyses indicating that the scope test is usually passed successfully (Walsh et 
al., 1992; Smith and Osborne, 1996; Carson, 1997; Brouwer et al., 1999; Rosenberger et al., 
1999; Poe et al., 2000).  
 
Scope test might be failed due to one of the following reasons: (1) insufficient power of the 
test, taking into consideration the difference in the level of provision of a public good (Arrow 
and Leamer, 1994); (2) errors resulting from invalid construction of hypothetical which masks 
the true, underlying sensitivity to scope (Carson and Mitchell, 1995); (3) embedding 
(Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992); and (4) the warm glow effect (Becker, 1974). Carson et al. 
(2000) analyze possible errors in construction of valuation scenarios that might lead to scope 
insensitivity. Some of the reasons include unclearly defined goods or changes in the level of 
their provision (Carson and Mitchell, 1993). In this case a respondent would be valuing a 
 4
different good from that intended by the researcher. This might also be one of the 
manifestations of embedding.  
 
Another possible reason for insufficient sensitivity to scope is the warm glow effect. As 
Knetsch and Sinden (1984) noted, respondents stating their WTP for public or environmental 
goods may in fact ‘purchase moral satisfaction’. The idea, inspired by the Olson’s (1965) 
concept of ‘inpure altruism’, was later renamed by Becker (1974) as a warm glow effect. The 
concept results from a notion that a respondent in fact derives additional utility from 
contributing to a public good, due to social assent, prestige or moral satisfaction.3 The concept 
was later used by Andreoni (1989; 1990) to demonstrate theoretically why progressive taxes 
might increase social and charitable spending and why government spending on these does 
not crowd out private contributions. Accepting warm glow as an explanation for insufficient 
sensitivity to scope would mean that a welfare change resulting from implementation of a 
particular scenario would not be fully and directly associated with changes to the good in 
question.4 This would imply a need to take into account motives for wanted a public good to 
be supplied when estimating values (McConnell, 1983; 1997; Bergstrom and Reiling, 1998; 
Johansson-Stenman, 1998). 
  
Even though warm glow or purchasing of moral satisfaction might contribute to insensitivity 
to scope (Cooper et al., 2004) there is a major problem with accepting these explanations for 
all observed problems with scope test. Despite the fact that warm glow effects are relatively 
well described in the literature devoted to charitable and social organizations, its extrapolation 
to the valuation of public goods would necessary mean that consumers derive higher utility 
with an increase in the taxes they pay or bids they accept (Chilton and Hutchinson, 1999). 
This would mean that there should be a positive relationship between declared WTP values 
and utility level derived solely from ‘moral satisfaction’ reasons. However, virtually all 
studies (to our knowledge) implementing warm glow as a component of utility function do 
this by introducing a non-zero constant representing warm glow in utility functions if a non-
zero WTP is declared. This constant is obviously independent of WTP or bid level. 
                                                 
3 According to some authors, in case of public goods the existence of warm glow effect means that respondents 
are in fact expressing their ethical, rather than economic preferences (Kahneman and Ritov, 1993; Ritov and 
Kahneman, 1997). 
4 This might be crucial in some applications such as cost-benefit analysis. If the respondents’ WTP partly reflect 
their ‘warm glow’, the welfare estimates are problematic to be used directly. 
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A conclusion one can draw from this brief overview of the literature on scope effects is that 
more research seems to be required in order to broaden understanding of the reasons for scope 
insensitivity. The next section offers an alternative explanation which does not depend on 
warm glow motivations.  
 
2.2 A new approach to thinking about scope effects 
We put forward a hypothesis that the elicited value of an environmental good depends not 
necessarily only on the physical characteristics of the good in question, but also on the ‘label’ 
under which it is ‘sold’. The label can be an important attribute in itself, in accordance with 
the decomposition framework put forward by Lancaster (1966). However, a label is different 
from all the other attributes because it is independent from all the physical (quantifiable) 
characteristics of the good, and depends instead on the respondent’s perception regarding the 
brand. This notion is in line with framing dependence, as suggested by (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 2000). We demonstrate that this approach allows for an alternative explanation of 
scope test problems and is devoided of the weaknesses of the warm glow effect. 
 
There is a vast marketing literature devoted to the importance of labels and brands, and how 
their associated images influence choices. Consumers are known to have preferences over 
labels in addition to the physical characteristics of goods. The influence of labels on 
consumers’ utility and choices is also supported by neurological studies (Roe and Haab, 
2007). A stark example is provided by McClure et al. (2004), who replicated ‘The Pepsi 
Challenge’ using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) of subjects’ brains to 
investigate preferences and information processing in choices between two well known soft 
drinks presented with and without brand names. The respondents given two samples of the 
same soft drink supplied without brand names (labels) were essentially indifferent. However, 
when one of the two identical samples was labelled as Coke or Pepsi, subjects systematically 
preferred Coke to the unlabelled alternative (which they were told could be Coke or Pepsi), 
despite both drinks being chemically identical (both Coke or both Pepsi). These results were 
also reflected in different neural responses of the subjects, who seemed to have neurologically 
processed labels (brands) differently. This provides a stark manifestation of labels influencing 
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preferences. The neural evaluative process, and subsequent choice of the product, may thus be 
altered by the presence of a label.  
 
We argue that a value of an environmental good (and probably, in general, a public good) 
elicited using stated preference methods depends partly on its physical characteristics and 
partly on the label under which it is presented to the respondents. To formalize the approach 
let indirect utility function v  be a function of a price vector P , income y , and a vector of 
attributes of an environmental (public) good Q  (for simplicity assume one public good).  
 ( ), ,v P y Q   (1) 
The attributes of the good consist of a label Lq  and a set of remaining physical (quantifiable) 
attributes 1Q− . Assume Lq  to be a binary variable representing inclusion of label in the 
description of the good, and the label to be desirable (thus 0
L
v
q
∂ >∂ ). In addition, since labels 
are independent from physical characteristics of the good we assume Lq  to be additively 
separable from 1Q− .  
 ( )1, , ,Lv P y q Q−  (2) 
This formulation allows us to derive compensating and equivalent surplus measures, where 
superscript 0  denotes the initial, and 1 the post-change level of the good:  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1
, , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
L L
L L
v P q Q y v P q Q y CV
v P q Q y v P q Q y EV
- -
- -
= -
= +
 (3) 
In a standard random utility setting (McFadden, 1974), assuming a vector of socio-
demographic and choice specific explanatory variables Z , respondent’s j  indirect utility 
becomes: 
 ( ) ( ), 1, , 1,, , , , , ,j j L j j j j j L j j j jv P q Q y V Z q Q y e- -= +  (4) 
where jε  is unobservable, individual specific error term. Note that the label component of 
utility is also individual-specific, since individuals might differ in their perception of the 
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significance or meaning of the label used. Assuming in turn additivity of the deterministic and 
stochastic parts of indirect utility function and an IID property of error terms, we may derive 
respondent’s j  willingness to pay5 from:  
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 0 0 01 1, , , , , ,j j L j j j j j L j jV Z q Q y WTP V Z q Q ye e- -- + = +  (5) 
In the case of a linear WTP function the result might be then simplified to show that estimated 
mean WTP ( )WTP  would be a function of two additive components – the set physical 
characteristics of the good 1Q− , and the label which was used for describing the good Lq : 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 LWTP Q g Q h q−= +  (6) 
The above formulation of mean WTP has some important implications. When two different 
levels of change in an environmental good are offered to respondents in a CVM exercise, and 
they are described using the same label, it is obvious that the estimated values of WTP would 
differ only with respect to its physical attributes 1Q−  (the real changes, for example the 
percentage of habitat safeguarded from development, or the area of woodland to be planted), 
while the label component Lq  of the mean WTP would remain constant. As a result, if the 
share of a value of the label in total WTP ( )WTP  was “sufficiently high”, then the observed 
WTP estimates for two levels of environmental good would not be “sufficiently different”. 
Only after controlling for the label effect on WTP would we expect the estimated WTPs in 
two, alternative change scenarios to pass the scope test. This is an idea which is amenable to 
empirical testing. 
 
3.  Design of the Empirical Study 
We employed a labelled Choice Experiment (Blamey et al., 2000) to test if welfare measures 
of implementing an environmental policy incorporates a value of a label, which is not 
associated with any physical characteristics of the good. We then demonstrate how the value 
of such a label can contribute to insufficient sensitivity to scope when alternative quantities of 
increase in the good are valued.  
 
                                                 
5 Assuming an improvement of an environmental good this will be their compensating surplus. 
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The context of the empirical application is the protection of forest biodiversity. The case study 
site was the Białowieża Forest in Poland, which is considered to be one of the most important 
remaining temperate natural lowland forests in Europe. Initial steps in identifying attributes 
and a label involved focus groups and verbal protocols, with subjects representing both the 
general population of Poland and local communities neighbouring the Białowieża Forest. 
Currently National Park designation applies to 16% of the Białowieża Forest area, and there is 
an ongoing debate about whether Park designation should be extended to the whole area of 
the forest. We found that respondents have preferences for extending the national park per se, 
irrespectively of what the extension would mean in terms of on-the-ground protection and 
management. Thus, national park designation was chosen as the label for providing 
environmental change, since it was not associated with any characteristics of the good to be 
valued (forest biodiversity), and yet appears to be widely recognized and desired by 
respondents.6 It should be clearly stated that qualitative analysis conducted via focus groups 
and verbal protocols did not show any biodiversity attributes to be associated with the 
selected label. The label was found not to increase probability or quality of the provision itself 
or influence the scenario in any other observable way. It was thus safe to conclude that 
emotional associations of the label were not tied to any of the specific attributes of the good.7  
 
In order to describe the likely changes in biological diversity of the forest, the most important 
elements of biodiversity were identified with cooperation from biologists and ecologists. This 
list of candidate attributes was then pre-tested on the general public using focus groups, 
resulting in the final selection of 4 attributes, at 3-4 levels. The selected attributes represented 
potential changes in the biodiversity as viewed by ecologists, as well as being comprehensible 
to respondents. The first attribute – natural ecological processes – represented natural 
dynamics of the Białowieża Forest. This illustrated natural changes of the forest’s flora – 
processes of succession and regression, fluctuation, degeneration and regeneration, as well as 
seasonal changes. According to our specialists, and as explained in the questionnaire, 
improvements in this attribute could be achieved by passive protection of a given percentage 
of the total area of the Białowieża Forest. Three possible levels of this attribute were: status 
quo – 16% of the area protected, partial improvement – 30% protected, and substantial 
improvement – 60% of the area to be passively protected. 
                                                 
6 It’s worth noting that many of the national parks in Poland have different management regimes and protection 
goals; thus ‘extending national park’ is not associated with any specific set of actions or characteristics.  
7 Such untied associations are referred to as ‘freestanding emotions’ (Rossiter and Percy, 1997).  
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Rare species of fauna and flora represented the second attribute. It was underlined in the 
description that this attribute represents not only known, but also yet unknown species. 
Examples of both flagship and lesser-known species were provided, together with information 
concerning the likelihood of yet-unknown species occurring in the forest, and their 
dependence on protection. A short general explanation of the importance of different species 
to ecosystem was provided. The possible levels of this attribute were: status quo – a decline 
threatening total extinction, partial improvement – maintaining current populations, and 
substantial improvement – maintaining and expanding current populations. This attribute is 
rather similar to that included by Christie et al (2006) in their choice experiment on 
biodiversity protection. 
 
Ecosystem components was the attribute characterizing the existence of biotopes and 
ecological niches, such as dead wood, natural ponds, streams, clearings etc. It was explained 
in the questionnaire that improvements in this attribute may be achieved by active protection 
of these components. This attribute could be important for respondents both for the existence 
of the components alone, as well as a proxy for better well-being of species inhabiting the 
forest. The possible levels of this attribute were: status quo – the lack of some components 
and decrease in the quality of the existing ones, minor improvement – regeneration of 
deteriorated components across 10% of the forest area, partial improvement – regeneration 
and protection across 30% of the forest, and substantial improvement – regeneration and 
protection across 60% of the forest area. 
 
The last attribute was monetary, representing the cost of an additional compulsory tax to be 
paid for the following 10 years. Each respondent was presented with four choice sets, each 
consisting of three alternatives. The first alternative always represented a status quo option 
and there was no variance in attribute levels (including cost). The two other alternatives were 
designed using orthogonal fractional factorial design. The first of these was always labelled 
‘extension of the national park’ while the second was labelled ‘other forms of protection’. 
Focus group studies and pretesting clearly showed that there was no embedding regarding 
‘extension of national park’ since the respondents did not think that the extension itself would 
bring about any other changes than the ones described by the attributes; it was none-the-less 
strongly highlighted in the questionnaire that both alternatives would essentially provide the 
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same changes to the environment. The design consisted of 32 choice sets blocked into 8 
questionnaire versions. An example of the choice card is given in Figure 1. 
 
4.    Results 
The face-to-face CE surveys were conducted in June 2007 on a nationwide representative 
quota sample of adult Poles by a professional surveying company. There were a total of 400 
surveys collected, resulting in 1600 choice observations.  
The statistical analysis of CE was conducted using NLOGIT 4.0. A number of different model 
specifications were tried, including Multinomial Logit, Error Components, Nested Logit, 
Heteroscedastic Extreme Value, Random Parameters Logit and Multinomial Probit – each in 
many possible functional forms. In virtually all models we found statistical significance of 
“PARK”, which represented choice of the labelled alternative – providing protection in a 
particular way. It is worth noting, that this variable represented value independent from 
changes in all the other attributes used. It may be interpreted as a premium consumers get 
when the protection plan is implemented through the extension of a national park – and thus 
providing an environmental good with a ‘label’. 
To select the best model the unnested models were compared using the Vuong test (Vuong, 
1989) and Clarke’s distribution-free test (Clarke, 2003; 2007). Where necessary, tests were 
corrected for different numbers of estimated coefficients using Schwarz’s (1978) Bayesian 
information criterion. The tests showed that Nested Logit Model with normalization of the 
scale parameter at the top level of the tree outperformed other models. Detailed results of the 
final model are given in Table 1. The explanatory variables are dummies representing 
different possible improvements in the levels of the attributes, thus allowing for nonlinear 
marginal utilities (the status quo being the reference level). Because there was no statistical 
difference between partial and substantial improvement in the Rare species of fauna and 
flora attribute, in most of the models the two levels are jointly represented as an improvement. 
PARK is a dummy representing the alternative specific constant for the labelled alternative 
‘extension of the national park’ and Cost is the monetary variable measured in PLN2007. As 
noted above, the significance of the PARK variable shows the presence of a clear labelling 
effect. 
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Table 1 about here 
 
Implementing the approach suggested in Louviere et al. (2006), WTP values for each level of 
the attributes were calculated, with reference to the status quo level of each attribute. The 
results, given in euro8, are summarized in Table 2. Standard errors were calculated using the 
Delta method; confidence intervals were estimated using parametric bootstrapping (Krinsky 
and Robb, 1986).  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
In order to demonstrate the influence of the label on scope sensitivity two policy scenarios 
were considered, both of which are currently being considered for actual implementation. In 
the first scenario ( )LO  only minimal improvements to all the attributes were included, while 
in the second scenario ( )HI  the attributes would be provided at the highest levels used in the 
CE design. The components of the two policies are summarized in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The resulting mean welfare estimates – LOWTP  and HIWTP  respectively – were calculated 
using the approach provided by Hanemann (1982). In order to compare the influence of the 
label on welfare estimates of the two policies in terms of scope sensitivity, the welfare 
estimates of the two policies were calculated including the label (Table 4a) and excluding it 
(Table 4b), through the device of either including or omitting the parameter on PARK in the 
compensating surplus calculations. Finding a scope effect would mean rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the mean WTP for the “low” scenario was equal to the mean WTP for the 
“high” scenario, since the scenarios differ in terms of the quantity of biodiversity conservation 
on offer. The means, standard errors and confidence intervals are based on parametric 
bootstrapping (Krinsky and Robb, 1986). 
                                                 
8 The values in euro were calculated using the following exchange rate: 1 euro ≈ 3.6 PLN. 
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We first analyze the difference in means between the two policy scenarios differing in 
attribute levels applying Park et al.’s (1991) method of non-overlapping confidence intervals. 
Based on the bootstrapped empirical distributions of mean welfare estimates of policies LO  
and HI  we conclude that the p-value that would allow to conclude that the welfare estimates 
are different (significance level assuring confidence intervals not to overlap) are 0.236 when 
the label is included, and 0.188 when the label effect is excluded. According to Poe et at. 
(1994; 2005) however, using confidence intervals for testing difference in means is 
inappropriate. Instead they propose a convolutions method, which consists in calculating all 
the possible differences between elements of a vector bootstrapped from the distribution ofthe 
higher mean and a vector bootstrapped from the distribution of the lower mean. As a result, 
the ratio of number of outcomes that are less than zero to the number of all the possible 
outcomes (equal to product of lengths of the two vectors) gives an exact p-value of the 
hypothesis that the mean of vector 1 is higher than the mean of vector 2. This is referred to as 
complete combinatorial convolutions method. Following this approach we have estimated p-
values for the hypotheses that HIWTP  is higher than LOWTP  for the estimates including the 
label and excluding it.9 The p-value for the null hypothesis that the welfare estimate of the 
policy scenario ‘ HI ’ is equal to that for the policy scenario ‘ LO ’ was estimated to be 0.1493 
for the case of including the label, and 0.0996 with the label excluded.  
 
This comparison demonstrates a potential influence that including a label in welfare estimates 
may have on sensitivity to scope of environmental policies. The two analyzed policies did not 
result in significantly different welfare estimates if the label effect was present in both of the 
welfare estimates (as the p-value is close to 0.15). However, excluding the label effect 
substantially increased the significance level of the difference. In our case excluding the label 
allows the researcher to accept the null hypothesis of difference in welfare estimates of the 
two policies at the 10% significance level: in other words, a statistically significant scope 
effect is only found when the label effect is controlled for. In the following sections we 
analyze the implications of these findings.  
 
                                                 
9 1e5-element vectors of welfare estimates were bootstrapped for each of the four policy scenarios. Estimating all 
the possible differences of pairs of vectors resulted in two 1e10-element vectors. Number of negative elements of 
each vector was calculated and divided by total number of elements to derive p-values.  
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5.    Discussion 
Our empirical study demonstrated that WTP for an increased protection level of an 
environmental resource may carry an additional component, resulting from presenting the 
scenario using a label which is recognized by the respondents as desirable. This may be the 
case even if the label does not associate with any identifiable attributes left out from the CE 
design. Such a ‘label effect’ may be of a more general character, and may apply to a range of 
environmental and public goods that can be associated with any sorts of labels. The value of 
the label can indeed constitute an important share of total value (in our case roughly 30%). 
Thus our empirical study confirms that the value of label may be a considerable component of 
the total WTP. This validates the relationship made explicit in formula (6), that WTP might 
depend not only on the physical attributes of the good, but may also consist of a constant 
component associated with the value of a label. 
 
In our case the label represented providing additional protection in the particular way – 
extending the national park. The preferences of respondents for national parks, even if no 
particular protection regime or attributes are associated with them, seem to be confirmed by 
the results of Bartczak et al. (forthcoming) and Jacobsen and Thorsen (forthcoming). These 
authors also observe premiums for the existence of national parks per se, i.e. irrespective of 
the actual protection policy implemented there. 
 
Our results clearly show that controlling for the value of a label in welfare estimates 
substantially increases the sensitivity of these estimates to changes in the physical 
characteristics of environmental goods (scope). This conclusion seems to be general, as long 
as (1) a label constitutes an important share of total economic value and (2) covariances 
between the parameter of a label in the indirect utility function with parameters of other 
attributes are non-negative. If (2) does not hold then excluding the label from welfare 
estimates would cause both the mean and standard error to decrease, which could result in 
uncertain impacts on the level of significance of the difference between welfare estimates of 
the two policies.  
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The theoretical framework of our hypothesis allows for explaining the insufficient sensitivity 
to scope observed in some studies. Since virtually all CV studies employ a specific scenario 
for valuation one may expect that at least in some of these studies some form of label may be 
an implicit but un-identified component of WTP. This would inevitably cause welfare 
estimates to be less sensitive to changes in scope of the valued good. It is not clear whether 
this would matter more for an attribute-based valuation like choice experiments compared 
with a whole-valued based approach such as contingent valuation. Important practical 
questions that arise are what might constitute a label for an environmental policy or good, and 
how to identify and devise the appropriate label for valuation scenarios. We believe that there 
are many possible labels depending on the particular good and on respondents’ preferences. 
Identifying appropriate labels requires qualitative analysis – pretesting, focus groups or verbal 
protocols, in a manner no different from selecting all the other attributes for the study. 
 
The value of a label is directly connected to the good in question or the scenario of its 
provision. It is thus worth discussing if the value of the label should or should not be included 
in welfare estimates. The answer to this question seems to depend on the research goal – if the 
study is aiming at estimating the total change of consumers’ welfare due to a change in 
provision of an environmental good, it is safe to conclude that the value of the label should be 
included in the total economic value estimates of the scenario. This represents a notion of 
consumer sovereignty (Carson et al., 2000) – if ‘purchasing’ a good with a particular label 
generates additional utility it should be accounted for in welfare estimates. On the other hand, 
if the aim of the study is to estimate implicit prices of the changes in environmental qualities 
(marginal or discrete) – it should probably be excluded and only the value resulting from the 
changes of physical attributes should be included. As our case study demonstrates, this is 
possible using the CE method.10  
                                                 
10 This discussion is somewhat similar to including / excluding ASC in welfare estimates of the scenarios 
(Adamowicz et al., 1998). Among many studies Rolfe et al. (2000), Bennett et al. (2001), Horne et al. (2005), 
Horne (2006) and Birol et al. (2006) included ASC in welfare estimates. On the contrary – Xu et al. (2003), 
Lehtonen et al. (2003), Biénabe and Hearne (2006) and Nielsen et al. (2007) include only implicit prices of 
physical attributes. Finally Adamowicz et al. (1998), Garber-Yonts et al. (2004), Watson et al. (2004), Mogas et 
al. (2005) and Meyerhoff et al. (forthcoming) report problems that may be encountered when including / 
excluding ASC in welfare estimates. It is thus safe to conclude that including / excluding ASC may be decisive 
for welfare estimates.  
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Our formulation of total economic value consisting of, among the others, a label, is partly in 
line with the works of Rolston (1988), Gunn (1980) and Rescher (1980) who propose the 
concept of ‘intrinsic’ value of the species, that would be irrespective of its actual 
representatives (real animals). This, according to them, explains the apparent paradox, that an 
animal of an endangered species would be more valuable than an animal of the same species 
except that not endangered. This view was criticized by Russow (1981) who claimed that the 
definition of a species is somewhat flexible and so species per se cannot have values, because 
defining more species would simply increase the total value. Assigning part of the value to 
labels recognized by the respondents deals with these problems and explains apparent 
paradoxes. This is because there may be only as many ‘premiums’ for species as there are 
recognizable labels. The value of a label of the same species may also be substantially 
different between two countries, depending on a role the species plays in national identity for 
instance (Jacobsen et al., 2008). An interesting example that can be interpreted as an 
importance of the label is provided by Jacobsen et al. (2008) who observe different welfare 
estimates of conservation programmes when describing them using quantitative descriptions 
of results, than when describing them using the names of the species to be protected. Even if 
the respondents were not familiar with the names of the species to be protected they seemed 
to process the information differently, and the utilisation of the name (label) altered their 
choices.  
This paper adds to the literature by proposing a new approach to value drivers of 
environmental goods. In the proposed formulation estimated willingness to pay consists of 
two sub-components: a function of a physical attributes of the good and a value of the label, 
which is used for presenting the good or valuation scenario to the respondents in stated 
preference methods. The proposed framework provides a new insight into preferences and 
elicited WTP, and has an important meaning for the application of welfare estimates. Our 
study provides evidence that labels may be a substantial constituent of estimated value and 
demonstrate that this may be a reason for insufficient sensitivity to scope of welfare estimates. 
Therefore, accepting value of a label as one of the components of estimated value of a good 
provides an alternative explanation of the sources of potential problems with the scope test.  
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Figure 1.   Example of a choice card 
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Table 1.   Nestel Logit Model estimates of the CE 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error p-value 
Natural Ecological Processes 
(1-level improvement) 0.28213
*** 0.09479154 0.0029 
Natural Ecological Processes 
(2-level improvement) 0.39521
*** 0.12019442 0.0010 
Rare Species 
(improvement) 0.19484
** 0.08553986 0.0227 
Ecosystem Components 
(1-level improvement) 0.26939
** 0.10561570 0.0108 
Ecosystem Components 
(2-level improvement) 0.30377
*** 0.10600908 0.0042 
Ecosystem Components 
(3-level improvement) 0.34398
*** 0.11899022 0.0038 
PARK 
(alternative specific constant)11 0.34743
*** 0.06257316 0.0000 
Cost -0.02126*** 0.00299983 0.0000 
Inclusive value12 0.60569*** 0.09979989      0.0000 
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively 
Number of observations             1213 
Log likelihood function              1220.485 
Chi squared                                   204.0790 
Degrees of freedom                          9 ( )2Pr critical valueχ > =                  0.0000000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 ASC PARK was representing particular way of implementing the change – providing the changes in the form 
of national park extension.  
12 The inclusive value for the non-restricted branch of the tree. The value between 0 and 1 is well within 
constraint for common component of random terms (Hensher and Greene, 2002).  
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Table 2. Implicit prices of the CE attribute levels (EURO) 
Attribute Implicit price 90% C. I. 
Standard 
error p-value 
Natural Ecological Processes 
(1-level improvement) 3.69
*** 3,42 - 5,86 1.0842 0.0007 
Natural Ecological Processes 
(2-level improvement) 5.16
*** 2,25 - 5,42 1.2913 0.0001 
Rare Species 
(improvement) 2.55
**  3,46 - 6,73 1.0215 0.0127 
Ecosystem Components 
(1-level improvement) 3.52
*** 1,17 - 3,83 1.2586 0.0052 
Ecosystem Components 
(2-level improvement) 3.97
*** 1,91 - 5,19 1.2335 0.0013 
Ecosystem Components 
(3-level improvement) 4.49
*** 2,37 - 5,57 1.3055 0.0006 
PARK 
(alternative specific constant) 4.54
*** 2,81 - 6,19 0.9468 0.0000 
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Table 3. Components of the policy scenarios 
Attributes Policy scenario ‘ LO ’ Policy scenario ‘ HI ’ 
Natural Ecological Processes 1-level improvement 2-level improvement 
Rare Species improvement improvement 
Ecosystem Components 1-level improvement 3-level improvement 
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Table 4a. Welfare estimates for policy scenarios with the label13 (EURO) 
Policy Welfare estimate 90% C. I. Standard error p-value 
LO  14.29 12.20 - 16.39 1.6347 .0000 
HI  16.74 14.47 - 19.02 1.7764 .0000 
 
Table 4b. Welfare estimates for policy scenarios without the label14 
(EURO) 
Policy Welfare estimate 90% C. I. Standard error p-value 
LO    9.75   8.04 - 11.46 1.3367 .0000 
HI  12.20 10.37 - 14.03 1.4309 .0000 
 
                                                 
13 Providing environmental changes in the form of extending the national park. 
14 Providing environmental changes without extending the national park. 
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Abstract  
Insufficient sensitivity to scope remains one of the pivots of criticism addressed at validity of 
stated preference methods. Many studies demonstrate failing a scope test of some sort, while 
many others show that WTP responses are sensitive to the scope of environmental change. 
Despite some existing explanations and reasons for insensitivity to scope (embedding, warm 
glow) there seems to exist no clear conclusion on how to deal with it. The paper provides an 
alternative explanation for insufficient sensitivity to scope, based on redefinition of value 
drivers of environmental goods. In the proposed framework respondents’ WTP need not 
depend only on physical characteristics of a valued good but may also partly be a function of 
a ‘label’ under which the environmental good is ‘sold’. To investigate this problem and 
empirically test the hypothesis and its implications a CE study in a biodiversity valuation 
setting is designed and conducted. The developed framework and empirical evidence provide 
an alternative explanation for problems with the insufficient sensitivity to scope observed in 
many studies. Finally, practical conclusions of the new framework – including and dealing 
with labels in environmental valuation scenarios are discussed. 
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